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Bank market power and firm performance 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Does market power of banks affect firm performance? To answer this question we examine 
25,236 syndicated loan facilities granted between 2000 and 2010 by 296 banks to 9,029 US 
non-financial firms. Accounting for both observed and unobserved bank and firm 
heterogeneity, we find that firms that were recently poorly performing obtain loans from 
banks with more market power. However, in the year after loan origination market power 
positively affects firm performance, but only if it is not too high. Our estimates thus suggest 
that bank market power can facilitate access to credit by poorly-performing firms, yet at the 
same time also boosts the performance of the firms that obtain credit. 
 
JEL classification: G21; G32; L13 
Keywords: Bank market power; Lerner index; Firm performance; Syndicated loans 
 
 1. Introduction 
What is the effect of bank market power on the performance of the borrowing firms? 
Answering this question enables us to assess the welfare implications of the efficient 
functioning of credit markets and the intermediary role banks play in the economy. Vis-à-vis 
the situation with perfect competition, market power introduces a deadweight loss, which in 
the loan market results in higher intermediation margins and lower productive efficiency for 
the borrowing firms. 
For the banking sector, however, this market description has to be qualified. A by-
now seminal theoretical and empirical literature argues that intense competition between 
banks, and the resultant close-or-equal-to zero profits in the sector, may increase the 
likelihood of bank failures and financial instability (e.g., Keeley, 1990). In addition, and 
equally importantly, a related theoretical literature (e.g., Petersen and Rajan; 1995; Caminal 
and Matutes, 1997, 2002; Boot and Thakor, 2000) argues that some degree of bank market 
power may be needed for strong and inter-temporally efficient bank-firm relationships to 
form. Such relationships may improve access to credit, leading to for example more 
innovation in healthier product markets, vertical and horizontal firm growth, and − at least in 
the medium term − higher profitability. Yet, as far as we are aware, little or no empirical 
work has directly tested the proposition that some bank market power is required to improve 
firm performance. 
 In this paper, we empirically analyze the correspondence between bank market power 
and firm performance, both before and after loan origination. For theoretical guidance we 
mainly rely on the contributions by Petersen and Rajan (1995), Caminal and Matutes (1997, 
2002), and Boot and Thakor (2000). These studies suggest that in order to extract maximum 
rent, banks with market power are incentivized to lend to firms that are currently relatively 
poorly-performing but that may well have good future investment opportunities. If banks 
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with market power also have a superior screening ability to spot these good investment ideas, 
funding these projects will be easier for them than for their competitors. Combined with the 
fact that banks with market power have better screening (Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor, 
1986) and monitoring capacity or exhibit greater monitoring effort (Matutes and Caminal, 
2002), the credit provision can improve the performance of the borrowing firms. The main 
reasons for this positive outcome is the availability of credit to fund a promising investment 
opportunity and the screening and monitoring advantages of banks with market power that 
safeguard the borrowing firm against suboptimal project selection and loan default.  
In view of these theoretical considerations, we focus on two testable hypotheses. First, 
banks with more market power engage or are engaged by poorly-performing firms (notice 
that prior to loan origination firm performance should be observable by banks). Above 
theoretical frameworks indeed imply that engagement may come from both sides (i.e., banks 
with firms or vice versa). To test this first associative hypothesis we formulate an empirical 
model that relates past performance of firms to the current market power of banks (i.e., the 
matching between firms and banks before the loan origination). Second, bank market power 
positively impacts the performance of the borrowing firms, because of the mere provision of 
credit and/or because banks with market power screen and monitor better thereby fostering 
superior investment ideas and outcomes. We test this second causal hypothesis by analyzing 
the effect of current bank market power on future firm performance. 
A notable feature in testing our first hypothesis is that we simply observe the 
matching process, taking the syndicate structure as given. That is, we do not provide any 
information about whether the borrowing firms initiate the relationship with banks with 
market power to gain access to credit or whether the lead banks choose the borrowing firms 
with inferior performance but profitable projects. To analyze the initiation of the bank-firm 
relationship we need data that is not generally available (e.g., data on loan applications, bank 
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networks, etc.). Similarly, the empirical tests of the second hypothesis use information only 
on established relationships (and syndicate structures) and are agnostic about how the results 
would change for originated loans that were initiated by firms compared to those initiated by 
banks. 
We use data from the US syndicated loan market over the period 2000-2010. This 
market includes large corporate loans granted by a syndicate of large banks to a single firm. 
Subsequently, we obtain information on characteristics of banks and firms from a number of 
other databases. This procedure yields a unique multi-level sample that contains many 
instances of multiple loans made by a single syndicate lead bank and/or obtained by a 
particular borrowing firm. We estimate the market power of banks at the bank-year level 
using the Lerner index (1934), which measures deviations of prices from marginal cost 
(Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013; Delis, Kokas, and Ongena, 2015), and capture firm 
performance with several variables, including the return on assets (ROA), return on income 
(ROI) and Tobin’s q. 
Estimating a bank market power equation (i.e., the first hypothesis) or a firm 
performance equation (i.e., the second hypothesis) is inevitably subject to severe omitted 
variables` concerns. The multi-level structure of our sample, i.e., multiple loans provided by 
the same bank and multiple loans obtained by the same firm, is in this respect important 
because it allows us to include comprehensive sets of both bank and firm fixed effects when 
estimating our empirical models. 
The first set of estimates we obtain documents that the firms that are relatively poorly-
performing match with banks that have more market power. Specifically, we show that a firm 
with an ROA that is one standard deviation higher than average (in the year prior to loan 
origination) matches with a bank with a Lerner index that is 44 percent lower (in the year of 
loan origination). The second set of estimates suggests a positive impact of bank market 
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power on firm profitability. In particular, an increase in the Lerner index of the bank by one 
standard deviation (in the year of loan origination) increases the ROA of the borrowing firm 
(in the year after loan origination) by 1.2 percentage points, a substantial increase as the 
average ROA in our sample is equal to 1.5 percent. 
Our results are robust to the use of alternative measures, e.g., Tobin’s q as a measure 
of firm performance, and for a variety of sub-samples and model specifications. We focus for 
example on the set of loans with syndicates that are recurring through time and then (in 
addition to many other controls) load in comprehensive sets of bank, firm and eventually also 
bank syndicate – firm fixed effects. Most of the remaining time series variation will then 
originate with the Lerner index, constituting a powerful test of the direct impact of the Lerner 
index on firm performance. 
Alternatively, we employ as an instrumental variable the formal regulatory 
enforcement actions enacted on banks for violations of rules on the internal control and audit 
systems. We expect these actions to be positively correlated with bank market power, 
because banks with more market power may be less transparent with respect to their internal 
control and audit systems. At the same time, these actions should in principle not have any 
direct impact on firm performance (also given the many bank-level control variables and the 
set of bank fixed effects that are also included). 
Finally, we show that specific elements characterizing the monitoring incentives of 
banks (i.e., the capacity to use soft information to monitor the loans, the significance of the 
loan to the firm, the number of syndicate lenders, and the loan amount weighted by the shares 
of the syndicate members) enforce the positive impact bank market power has on future firm 
performance. In this respect our results are consistent with Besanko and Kanatas (1993), who 
show that bank loans are “special” because they combine lending with the provision of 
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monitoring services that increase entrepreneur effort and thereby improve the project’s 
success probability. 
In sum, these findings are overall consistent with theory providing a monitoring-based 
explanation of the positive impact of current bank market power on future firm performance 
(Caminal and Matutes, 1997, 2002; Boot and Thakor, 2000). However, we also find that for a 
limited number of very large values of the Lerner index (that would suggest near-
monopolistic behavior of banks), the effect of market power on firm performance turns 
negative. This implies that too much market power is eventually harmful for the borrowing 
firms. In fact, this finding is consistent with implications from the theoretical framework of 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), who show that as banks charge higher loan rates due to lower 
competition, the borrowers optimally increase their own risk of failure. Thus, our empirical 
results explain these two competing theories dealing with the real outcomes of bank-firm 
relationships according to the degree of competition in the banking sector. 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the context of our 
study and formulates the two testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the empirical model 
and the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical identification 
procedure and the estimation results. Section 5 summarizes the results and provides policy 
implications. 
 
2. Testable hypotheses 
The traditional view on competition in the banking sector is that − as in any other sector − it 
enhances the efficiency and the quality of production of banking products and the welfare of 
borrowers. These can be achieved through the decline in interest rate margins, increased 
access to finance and better investment opportunities for firms and households (Besanko and 
Thakor, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). However, the welfare implications of competition 
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in the banking industry are not as straightforward as in other industries. Keeley (1990) was 
perhaps the first to point out that more intense competition in banking (in terms of low price-
cost margins) leads to a more risky banking sector through the increased incentives of 
competitive, and thus less profitable, banks to take on higher risks (margin effect). The 
empirical tests in this literature, e.g., Jimenez, Lopez, and Saurina (2013), focus on the 
relation between bank market power and risk, almost entirely disregarding the role and the 
performance outcomes of the borrowing firms.1 However, the theoretical literature is not only 
about banks; it also considers the bank-firm relationships and their effect on the real 
economy. 
 The bank-firm relationship has two components: there is (i) the matching process 
between banks and firms prior to the loan origination; and there is (ii) the performance of the 
borrowing firms after the loan origination. Considering the former, Petersen and Rajan (1995) 
suggest that banks in a competitive market are constrained to break even on period-by-period 
basis and are unlikely to provide credit to distressed or young firms with relatively low 
performance measures, even though the investment opportunities of these firms are 
profitable. In contrast, banks with monopoly power can better extract future rents from 
profitable projects of relatively poorly-performing firms, because they can afford to provide 
risky credit to these firms.  
 Similarly, Boot and Thakor (2000) theoretically show that as bank market competition 
increases (decreases) banks make more (less) relationship loans, but each loan has more (less) 
added value for borrowers. In this model banks with more market power lend to borrowers 
with low a priori performance but with profitable investment opportunities. This is the case 
because banks optimally prefer to capture most of the incremental benefit of a relationship 
loan. 
                                                            
1  An exception is Cetorelli (2004), who explores whether bank concentration affects the structure of 
nonfinancial industries, using a panel of manufacturing industries in 29 OECD countries. The evidence suggests 
that lower concentration in the banking industry leads to a lower average firm size. 
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 A further issue worth mentioning is that an empirical literature suggests that banks 
with market power possess a superior ability to screen the profitable investment ideas (e.g., 
Gehrig, 1998). Also, firms perceived as highly risky might be more easily rejected by capital 
markets and will be forced to accept the tighter terms of private lenders. To the extent that 
these tighter terms also include borrowing from banks with higher price-cost margins, these 
firms would be matched with high market-power banks. In sum, these influential theoretical 
papers allow us to formulate the following empirically testable hypothesis: 
 
H1: Low-profitability firms will tend to be matched with banks with high market power. 
 
 An analysis of the matching process for banks and firms has its own merits, but 
perhaps the most important issue for real economic outcomes concerns the future 
performance of the firms that borrow from banks with more market power. Boyd and De 
Nicolo (2005) reconsider the competition-fragility nexus in Keeley (1990) by focusing on the 
role played by firms. They show that as competition declines, banks charge higher loan rates, 
which imply higher bankruptcy risk for borrowers. Then, within a moral hazard framework, 
the borrowing firms optimally increase their own risk of failure (risk-shifting effect). 
 The most relevant theoretical models for our purposes are these of Boot and Thakor 
(2000) and Caminal and Matutes (1997, 2002). One of the findings of the former study is that 
lenders can improve the future borrowers’ performance (project payoff) through intense 
monitoring of the loan after its origination and that this monitoring can generate higher 
borrower surplus to be shared between the lender and the borrower. Caminal and Matutes 
(1997) explicitly study the welfare implications of market power in banking and suggest two 
opposing effects being at work. On the one hand, higher market power worsens the terms of 
credit and reduces investment, but on the other hand higher market power induces banks to 
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exert higher monitoring effort and reduces the frequency of credit rationing. Whenever the 
second effect dominates, some degree of market power is beneficial for economic welfare.  
Similarly, Caminal and Matutes (2002) show that banks’ incentives to exert monitoring effort 
increase with market power, by allowing banks to commit to monitoring in order to reduce 
agency problems. 
 Banks with some market power in lending can enhance the borrower's performance in 
at least five ways. Most of these ways stem from the idea that banks with some market power 
are able to finance projects with a positive expected payoff that competitive banks cannot 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995). First, the mere funding by a bank with market power of an 
investment idea with a positive expected payoff will generate increased profitability for the 
borrowing firm. This implies that the bank with market power has both the financial capacity 
to provide the required credit to a good investment idea and that banks with market power 
have superior ability to screen the good investment ideas (Chan et al., 1986). Second, a bank 
with market power could provide additional financing to a liquidity-constrained firm even 
after the initial loan origination. This financing may come via an extra loan facility 
(commitment), with an accompanying enhancement in the borrower's payoff. Third, a bank 
with market power can more effectively increase the debt payoff restructuring of a financially 
distressed borrower by performance pricing. Fourth, this bank may hold other loans in the 
industry and know more about this industry compared to its borrowers, thus being able to 
provide valuable advice. Fifth, assuming that banks with market power have a superior 
monitoring capacity (which they developed through a learning-by-doing process), the nexus 
between the market power of banks at the time of loan origination and the future performance 
of firms should be positive.2 
                                                            
2 Caminal and Matutes (2002) show that incentives to monitor are enhanced by market power. 
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 A number of empirical papers analyze the bank-firm relationship and indirectly offer 
additional potential explanations for a link between bank market power and future firm 
performance. De Haas and Van Horen (2013) for example study the syndicated loan market 
and suggest that local lending experience also gives banks more market power vis-a-vis their 
borrowers (who have even less incentive then to switch to another bank and banks can exploit 
this by charging a higher interest rate). This is because through repeat lending (lending 
experience from the same banks that participate in the syndication or lending to the same 
firm), banks reduce information asymmetries and build up proprietary information about 
borrowers. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Dass and Massa (2011) show that a stronger bank-
firm relationship may even improve the borrower’s corporate governance and therefore 
increase its value. For instance, relationship lending can lower the interest rates charged by 
the banks. Moreover, a bank may be interested in preserving the market value of the firm to 
avoid an increase in the firm’s market leverage, or just to preserve the market valuation of the 
collateral posted by the borrower. 
 The theoretical considerations discussed above, especially those in Petersen and Rajan 
(1995) and Boot and Thakor (2000) versus those in Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), also suggest 
that there may be a non-linear relation between bank market power and firm performance. 
This type of relation would be similar to the proposition in Caminal and Matutes (1997) on 
the two opposing forces of bank market power affecting economic welfare analyzed above. 
Further, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) suggest that the risk-shifting effect identified by 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) dominates in monopolistic markets, whereas the margin effect 
identified by Keeley (1990) dominates in competitive markets. Even though the model of 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo concerns bank risk as the outcome variable (and not firm risk or 
performance), we could theoretically conceive a similar outcome for the bank-firm 
relationship: Too much bank market power could eventually trigger a situation where firms 
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optimally decide to default on their loans due to the oppressing level of market power 
attached to this loan. 
 Whether the effect of bank market power on firm performance after loan origination 
is positive, negative or hump-shaped becomes an empirical question. However, we should 
note that most of the directly relevant theoretical literature and the indirectly relevant 
empirical literature point to a positive effect of bank market power on future firm 
performance. Thus, we formulate our second testable hypothesis as follows: 
 
H2: Bank market power has a positive effect on the performance of the borrowing firms after 
the origination of the loan. 
 
 The two testable hypotheses are interrelated in a dynamic way. Specifically, the 
relatively poorly-performing firms before the origination of the loan (reference to H1) might 
improve their performance (reference to H2) if they borrow from banks with market power. 
Thus, an empirical analysis that validates both H1 and H2 will suggest a beneficial effect of 
market power in banking that has not been explored yet (as far as we know) in the related 
empirical literature. 
 It is important at this stage to note two issues. First, the discussion here refers to 
relatively developed banking and financial systems. If markets are not deep enough and 
institutions are weak, then the forces highlighted above might not be at work and market 
power can be damaging to firm performance (see also Delis, 2012). Second, there is a stark 
difference between the two hypotheses in terms of causality. Hypothesis 1 does not imply a 
causal relation; it just infers that firms with relatively low profitability will be matched with 
banks with relatively high market power. In contrast, Hypothesis 2 suggests a positive impact 
from bank market power on firm performance in the period after loan origination. 
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3. Empirical model and data 
Based on our two hypotheses, we estimate two different empirical models. First, we examine 
whether banks with high market power are matched with relatively poorly-performing firms. 
This translates to an empirical model of the form: 
Lernerb,t = φ Rf,t-1 + δ1 Ff,t-1 + δ2 Llt+ δ3 Bb,t-1 + εfbt .      (1) 
In equation (1) the market power, labelled “Lerner”, of bank b at the time of loan origination 
t, is regressed on the performance R of firm f at t-1, a vector of firm characteristics F at t-1, a 
vector of loan characteristics L at t, and a vector of banks’ characteristics B at t-1. The term ε 
is a stochastic disturbance term. For identification purposes we also include both bank and 
firm fixed effects. Their inclusion we discuss further below. 
 The timing of the variables is in line with the idea that the firms with certain 
characteristics at time t-1 will seek to obtain a loan at time t from a bank (or a number of 
banks) with a level of market power Lerner at that time t. In addition, banks with a specific 
Lerner at time t will check the available financial statements of the firms from the previous 
period t-1 to decide on the origination of the loan or not (statements from the period t would 
not be available yet). Our testable hypothesis H1 implies that φ should be negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that firms with relatively low performance are associated 
with banks’ with more market power. 
In turn, H2 refers to the effect of banks’ market power on the performance of firms 
after the loan agreement. The fielded empirical model is: 
Performancef,t+1 = θ0 Performancef,t + γ Lernerb,t + θ1 Ff,t-1 + θ2 Llt+ θ3 Bb,t-1 + ufbt , (2) 
where u is the stochastic disturbance, and the rest of the variables are as above. H2 implies 
that γ is positive and statistically significant and the timing of the model assumes that the 
market power of bank at time t has an effect on the performance of firms in the next period. 
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3.1. Data and the syndicated loan market  
We construct a unique database including information on syndicated loans, the involved 
banks, and the borrowing firms. We focus on US syndicated loan deals for the period 2000-
2010.3 We draw data from five different data sources and match them to construct our final 
sample. Our data sources are the Thomson Reuters LPC’s DealScan database, the Call reports 
from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (FRB), Compustat, the New Generation 
Research Bankruptcy (NGRB) database, and hand-collected data on enforcement actions that 
have been enacted by the three main U.S. banking supervisory authorities (FDIC, OCC, and 
RFB). 
 We begin with only a brief description of the syndicated loan market, as this market 
has been extensively analyzed before by a number of studies (e.g., Sufi, 2007). The 
syndicated loans are credits granted by a group of banks to a single borrower. Loan 
syndication allows banks to compete with the capital markets in the generation of relatively 
large transactions that a sole lender would not otherwise be able (or willing) to undertake due 
to internal and regulatory restrictions. These loans represent a hybrid instrument, combining 
features of relationship and transactional lending. They allow the sharing of credit risk 
between various financial institutions without the disclosure and marketing burden that bond 
issuers face. 
 In general, the syndication process works as follows. The borrowing firm signs a loan 
agreement with the lead arranger, who specifies the loan characteristics (collateral, loan 
amount, covenant, a range for the interest rate, etc.). The members of the syndicate fall into 
three groups, namely the lead arranger or co-leads, the co-agents, and the participant lenders. 
                                                            
3 We decided to restrict our analysis to this period because of two main reasons. First, we lack data on important 
variables before 2000. Second, there are important banking regulatory reforms before 2000 (Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 and other earlier ones) and in 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act of 2010) that clearly affect both bank 
market power and firm performance in non-uniform ways across banks and firms. 
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The first group consists of senior syndicate members and is led by one or more lenders, 
typically acting as mandated arrangers, arrangers, lead managers or agents. If two or more 
lead arrangers are identified, they are then co-leads. Lead arrangers coordinate the 
documentation process, choose whom to invite to participate in the loan syndicate and may 
delegate certain tasks to the co-agents. In addition, the lead arranger receives a fee (paid by 
the borrower) for arranging and managing the syndicated loan. 
 The co-agents are not in a lead position but they collaborate with the lead arranger in 
administrative responsibilities, as well as in the screening and monitoring efforts. The lenders 
with neither lead nor co-agent roles are classified as participant lenders. These lenders can 
provide comments and suggestions when the syndication occurs prior to closing. However, 
they are not generally involved in the negotiations or the information sharing between the 
borrower and the lead arrangers (or the co-agents if applicable). The price and the structure of 
the loans are determined in a bargaining process that takes place between the lead bank and 
the potential participants after the non-price characteristics of the loan are set. 
 A key aspect differentiating a syndicated loan from multiple sole-lender loans is that 
the members of the syndication reduce their costs by avoiding staff, monitoring, and 
origination costs. However, this benefit comes at a cost. The loan syndication market could 
display some unique types of agency problems, stemming both from adverse selection and 
moral hazard. The adverse selection problem arises when the participant lenders do not have 
private information about the borrower’s quality. The moral hazard problem emerges when 
lenders decide to sell in the secondary market parts of the loan to a “passive” lender whose 
incentives to monitor are reduced. 
 The information for the syndicated loan deals is from DealScan. This database 
provides detailed information on the loan deal’s characteristics (amount, maturity, collateral, 
borrowing spread, performance pricing, etc.), as well as more limited information for the 
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members of the syndicate, the lead bank, the share of each bank in the syndicated (which is 
important in the construction of our measure of market power discussed below) and the firm 
that receives the loan.4 
 To obtain information for the financial statements of the banks we match these data 
with the Call Reports.5 Because these reports are available on a quarterly basis, we match the 
information on the origination date of the loan deal with the relevant quarter. For example, 
we match all syndicated loans that were originated from April 1st to June 30th with the second 
quarter of that year of the Call Reports.6 In a similar fashion, we obtain information for the 
financial statements of firms from Compustat, the information being available annually. 
Further, the New Generation Research Bankruptcy database provides information for the 
timing of borrower defaults. Subsequently, we assume that an outstanding loan defaults if the 
borrowing firm also defaults. 
 Our analysis is conducted at the “loan-facility” level, as opposed to the “loan-deal” 
level. The difference between the two is that the loan facility refers to each individual portion 
of a deal, whereas the deal itself comprises potentially multiple loan facilities and covers the 
full amount of credit granted to the firm on that occasion. A loan-facility analysis is 
appropriate for the following reason. Loan facilities may have different starting dates, 
maturity, amount, and loan type. Hence, multiple loan facilities, even when in the same loan 
deal, cannot be treated as fully dependent observations (e.g., simply adding facilities and 
ignoring their differences, may therefore introduce a bias in the estimates). However, all 
                                                            
4 Note that some loans in our sample (2,620 observations in total) are amendments to original loan agreements. 
In the syndicated loan market, unanimity of all syndicate members is required for any change in major terms of 
the original contract. The DealScan database gathers amendment data and considers amendments that require 
unanimous consent to be new loans. As a result, such amendments are recorded as independent deals that cannot 
be distinguished from new issuances. Yet, excluding the amendment loan facilities from our sample does not 
produce any differences in our results. 
5 We hand-match Dealscan’s lender ID with the commercial bank ID (RSSD9001) from the Call Reports. This 
process yields a unique identity for each lender. In turn, we link the lenders at their top holding company level 
(RSSD9348) to avoid losing observations (Cai, Saunders, and Steffen, 2012). 
6  The banks used in our sample are relatively homogeneous in their activities and specialization. Thus, 
alternative explanations of the findings based on bank specialization (and not based on screening and monitoring 
of projects) may not be applicable. 
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results presented below are robust to a loan-deal analysis. In our sample, 80 percent of the 
loan deals contain only one facility, and the remainder two or more facilities. 
 The matching process yields a maximum of 25,236 loan facilities (17,952 loan deals), 
originated by 296 banks and involving 9,029 non-financial firms. However, the number of 
observations used for the regressions is a bit lower depending on the availability of data for 
the different variables used. This sample is a so-called multi-level data set, which has 
observations on banks and firms (lower level) and loan deals (higher level). This is a unique 
feature that proves particularly helpful for econometric identification purposes. Table 1 
formally defines all variables used in the empirical analysis and Table 2 offers summary 
statistics. We briefly discuss these variables in turn. The bottom panel of Table 1 shows that 
most of the variation in the Lerner index is between banks as opposed to within banks over 
time. 
[Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here] 
 
3.1. Measures of bank market power 
The measurement of market power of banks has received much attention in the literature. The 
Lerner index (1934) remains to this day a popular measure of market power, measuring 
departures from the competitive benchmark of marginal cost pricing. It is defined as: 
ܮ݁ݎ݊݁ݎ௕௧ ൌ ௉್೟ିெ஼್೟௉್೟            (3) 
where P and MC are the price of bank output at time t and the marginal cost of the production 
of this output, respectively. The Lerner index ranges between zero and one, with zero 
corresponding to perfect competition and larger values reflecting more market power (and 
less competition). The index can also be negative if P < MC, which is of course not 
sustainable in the long run (at least for a market-based financial institution). 
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The Lerner index has a number of characteristics that make it an appealing measure of 
market power. First, the Lerner index is perhaps the only structural indicator of market power 
that can be estimated at the bank-year level. This is quite important for the purposes of our 
study, as we examine bank-firm relationships. Second, as Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens 
(2013) argue, the Lerner index is a good proxy for current and future profits stemming from 
pricing power, while it is not constrained by the extent of the market. Moreover, the Lerner 
index captures both the impact of pricing power on the asset side of the banks’ balance sheet 
and the elements associated with the cost efficiency on their liability side. 
Alternative measures of market power include the H-statistic (Panzar and Rosse, 
1987) and the profit elasticity (Griffith, Boone, and Harrison, 2005). The H-statistic has been 
widely used in banking studies, but has two main shortcomings. First, as Bikker, Shaffer, and 
Spierdijk (2012) point out, the H-statistic maps the various degrees of market power only 
weakly and thus cannot be viewed as a continuous variable. Second, it is quite difficult to 
measure and interpret the H-Statistic as a bank-year measure of market power. The profit 
elasticity (or Boone indicator) has been used in some recent studies but has also received 
criticism, especially concerning its empirical implementation. For example, Schiersch and 
Schmidt-Ehmcke (2010) show that the empirical equivalent of the Boone indicator makes 
critical assumptions relative to firm size and to the definition of the market. Further, it is also 
difficult to estimate the Boone indicator at the bank-year level. 
Computation of the Lerner index requires knowledge of the marginal cost. When such 
information is unavailable (as in most empirical data sets), the marginal cost can be estimated 
using econometric methods. A popular approach has been to estimate a translog cost function 
and take its derivative to obtain the marginal cost. Some recent work has shown that it is 
possible to improve on this methodology with semiparametric or nonparametric methods that 
allow for more flexibility in the functional form (Delis, Iosifidi, and Tsionas, 2013; Delis, 
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Kokas, and Ongena, 2015). As we follow the exact same approach as in Delis, Kokas, and 
Ongena (2015), we only provide salient details in the online Appendix A.7 We also consider 
the sensitivity of our results using and the translog cost (parametric method) function to 
estimate marginal cost (e.g., Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013). 
 Notably, the Lerner index is an absolute measure of market power and needs to be 
weighted with the share of each bank in the syndicated loan. Our database contains full 
information on loan shares for 24 percent of all loans and for these loans we allocate the 
exact loan portions to the individual lenders. For the other 76 percent we primarily employ 
the approach introduced by De Haas and Van Horen (2013); that is we divide the loan equally 
among the syndicate members. Section 4.2 presents robustness tests that show that our results 
also hold when we allocate the shares for the 76 percent of the sample in other ways (as in De 
Haas and Van Horen). 
 
3.2. Measures of firm performance  
Our main measure for firm performance is the return on assets (ROA), which is used by the 
majority of the corporate finance literature (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009). In our baseline 
specifications we calculate ROA as the net firm income over total assets. We also use a 
variant of this traditional definition for ROA, namely the ratio of income before extraordinary 
items over total assets, henceforth abbreviated as ROI (Dass and Massa, 2011). 
Another commonly-used measure of firm performance that we also employ in our 
analysis is Tobin’s q (as in e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009; and Dass and Massa, 2011). 
Tobin’s q is a future-oriented and risk-adjusted measure of performance, reflecting the 
premium that the capital market will pay for a given level of firm assets. Finally, we also use 
a measure of firm leverage, constructed by the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. The 
                                                            
7 Also, in Table A1 of the same appendix, we report the annual averages and the weighted (by the shares of each 
bank that participate in the syndicated loan) annual averages of the Lerner index. 
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higher this ratio, the higher the degree of leverage and consequently the lower the firm`s 
performance. 
 
3.3. Control variables 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Sufi, 2007; Cai, Saunders and Steffen, 2012), we 
include several loan-level, bank-level, and firm-level control variables to rule out other 
possible explanations for our results (we provide formal definitions in Table 1 and summary 
statistics in Table 2). Loan facilities mainly differ across the amount, maturity, loan scale, 
interest rates, and loan type (term loan vs. revolver line). Thus, we control for these 
differences through adding loan-level variables that include the size of the loan (deal 
amount), the time to maturity (maturity), the deal amount over firm’s total assets (loan scale), 
the all-in-spread-drawn (AISD) as a measure of the pricing of the loan, a dummy that equals 
to one if the loan is a revolver line credit (revolver), and a series of dummy variables 
describing a number of loan-quality characteristics. Specifically, we include a dummy 
variable equal to one when the loan is downgraded and zero otherwise (downgrading) to 
control for the credit rating of loan’s devaluation (Sufi, 2007); a dummy variable equal to one 
when a borrower defaulted during the life of the loan (default) to control for bankruptcies 
(Cai, Saunders and Steffen, 2012); the number of financial covenants (financial covenants) to 
control for unobservable borrower risk factors (Carey and Nini, 2007); a dummy variable 
equal to one if the loan has collateral (collateral) to control for problems of information 
asymmetry (Sufi, 2007); and a dummy variable equal to one if a performance pricing option 
is included in the loan contract (performance pricing) to control for borrower’s business 
prospects (Ross, 2010). 
Concerning the bank-level control variables, we use non-performing loans as a 
measure of ex post bank credit risk; the ratio of interest expenses to total assets (interest 
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expenses) to control for the interest coverage and the efficiency of the bank in managing core 
liabilities; the ratio of tier 1 capital to total loans (tier 1) to control for bank capitalization; the 
natural logarithm of real total assets (bank size); and the ratio of customer deposits to total 
assets (deposits) to control for the level of bank deposits supporting total assets. 
Finally, at the firm level, we control for firm size, measured by the natural logarithm 
of total assets; the number of syndicated loans that a firm has received during a year (number 
of loans) to control for the available information on the borrower especially to guide potential 
participant banks; a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has a previous lending 
relationship with the lead arranger in the last five years (client) as a proxy for the closeness of 
their relationship; firm efficiency measured by sales to total assets to control for asset 
turnover; firm age as a proxy for information availability and experience of the firm; and the 
natural logarithm of sales over turnover (firm sales) to control for future profits’ capability. 
 
4. Empirical identification and estimation results 
4.1. Empirical identification 
In our empirical analysis, and following the usual practice in studies of the syndicated loan 
market (e.g., Cai, Saudners and Steffen, 2012; De Haas and Van Horen, 2013), we use the 
available observations for all the participants in each syndicated loan and not only those for 
the lead arranger(s). In loan syndication, all members share loan documents (loan agreement, 
collateral, covenant, etc.) and provide comments, suggestions, and any available information 
to enhance screening and monitoring ability of the lead bank(s). Each member is a lender to 
the borrower, with every bank’s claim evidenced by a separate note. Song (2004) suggests 
that banks co-manage deals in order to enhance their services (monitoring and transactions 
activity) in response to clients’ specific needs. Also, the lead arrangers choose to collaborate 
with those banks that have a similar focus in terms of lending expertise. Moreover, the lead 
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arrangers assign more responsibilities to banks that they are already “connected” with, and 
delegate some monitoring duties accordingly (Cai, Saunders, and Steffen, 2012). However, 
we do show that our findings are robust to the analysis being conducted for different levels of 
clustering (bank, loan facility, etc.), for different sub-samples, and only for the lead arrangers. 
In equation (1) we are only concerned with the matching of firms and banks and not 
with the identification of a causal relation running from firm performance to bank market 
power. Thus, we are interested only in reducing the omitted-variable bias, as this might affect 
the economic significance of φ. The omitted-variable bias could arise because there are 
unobservable reasons behind the choice to lend to a specific firm or borrow from a specific 
bank. On this front, the structure of our sample, including multiple loans made by each bank 
for each firm, allows including both bank and firm high dimensional fixed effects. This 
identification strategy essentially accounts for other unobserved bank and, most importantly, 
firm-specific characteristics that could inflict a correlation between φ and ε. In alternative 
specifications we also include loan purpose fixed effects. The particular methodology used is 
thoroughly described in Gormley and Matsa (2014). Khwaja and Mian (2008), and following 
them Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2012; 2014) for example, use a similar 
identification method to avoid the omitted-variable bias. 
In contrast, in equation (2) we are interested in identifying a causal relation running 
from bank market power to firm performance. In this sense, endogeneity can arise both from 
reverse causality and an omitted-variable bias. We account for reverse causality by lagging 
all the right-hand side variables except for loan characteristics. This is intuitive both 
statistically and theoretically. From a statistical viewpoint, explanatory variables in lags can 
potentially diminish endogeneity issues that emerge due to reverse causality. On the 
theoretical side, it will probably take some time after the origination of the loan for bank 
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market power to have an effect on the performance of the borrowing firms through 
monitoring for example. 
We essentially eliminate the omitted-variable bias using the same strategy with that 
for the estimation of equation (1), i.e., we use high dimensional fixed effects for firms and 
banks. Consequently, our identification strategy yields a very large R-squared value. We 
should perhaps note that the time dimension is not an issue, because the loan deals are unique 
(not repeated in time). Our sample of loan facilities is essentially a cross-section of loans 
across banks and firms and we include data for variables according to the timing noted in 
equations (1) and (2). That is, we do not use a true panel data set for firms and banks, in the 
sense that loan facilities are not repeated. Thus, the effect of the general conditions affecting 
bank market power and firm performance is already captured by the loan-level controls and 
the bank- and firm-related fixed effects.8  
 
4.2. The matching of low-performance firms with high-market power banks 
In Table 3 we report the baseline regression results from the estimation of equation (1). The 
adjusted R-squared value, ranging from 0.91 to 0.97, shows that the inclusion of bank and 
firm fixed effects almost eliminates the omitted-variable bias. The coefficient on lagged ROA 
in all specifications is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, showing that 
the firms with relatively low ROA in the year before the loan origination will be matched 
with banks with high market power. To provide an example of the economic significance of 
our results for the bank-firm relationship, consider a firm with ROA equal to a one standard 
deviation lower than our sample’s mean. Based on a linearity assumption for the relation 
                                                            
8 Including bank*year and firm*year fixed effects is still feasible, as some banks give out more than one loan 
within a given year and some firms obtain more than one loan facility within a given year. However, these 
effects almost completely identify equations (1) and (2) and may not add much to the identification, given that 
the loan-level controls and the bank and firm fixed effects already incorporate the information defining the 
bank-firm relationship. 
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between ROA and the Lerner index,9 and according to specification I, a firm with a one 
standard deviation higher ROA (0.456) will be matched with a bank with a 0.004 points 
lower Lerner index (calculated from the product 0.009 x 0.456). This represents around 10 
percent of its mean and standard deviation (that equal 0.037 and 0.051, respectively). The 
opposite will hold for a firm with a one standard deviation lower ROA. This findings seems 
to confirm H1 (or more appropriately, reject its alternative) on the matching between the low 
profitability firms and banks with high market power. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In columns II-VI, we examine the sensitivity of our results to several re-specifications 
of column I. Our findings are qualitatively the same and economically more significant when 
we carry out our analysis at the loan-deal level (column II). In model III, we conduct an 
analysis only for lead arranger(s). In this case, the variance of the standard error increases due 
to the smaller sample, but the coefficient on the ROAt-1 remains negative and gains in 
economic significance. In column IV, we exclude loans originated for leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs) or mergers and acquisitions (M&As) because these loans can lower the cost of debt 
by reducing the asymmetric information between the bank and the borrowing firm (Ivashina 
and Kovner, 2011).10 However, the results are almost identical to those of column I.  
In column V we estimate equation (1) only for revolving credit (up until now we 
control for the loan type, revolver or term loans, by using the revolver dummy variable). 
Revolver loans, also known as bank lines of credit, loan commitments or credit facilities, are 
one of the main liquidity instruments for corporations. Our theoretical considerations mostly 
apply to revolver loans and not to term loans and it is important to exclude the former and 
examine the robustness of our results. However, our results are again almost identical to those 
                                                            
9 We examine possible non-linear effects by adding the squared term of ROA among the regressors, but we find 
no such effects. 
10 The cost of financing might be lower because the bank has acquired private information about the borrowing 
firm from prior transactions, which might, for example, enhance its confidence in the firm’s due diligence 
process. 
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in column I. In column VI, we drop loans in which the lead arranger is one of the largest 
three U.S. banks, namely J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup. This analysis 
allows us to examine whether results are driven solely from the efficiency of the very large 
banks to originate large loan deals. However, our results remain qualitatively similar to the 
baseline specification.  
 We conduct a series of additional robustness tests that we include in the table B1 in 
the online appendix. First, we use only bank fixed effects, add purpose fixed effects, or 
cluster the standard errors by year or by loan. Second, we use alternative methods to weight 
the Lerner index, instead of using equal shares for the members of the syndicate (see also De 
Haas and Van Horen, 2013). Third, we use a translog specification (instead of the non-
parametric specification). The results are equivalent to those reported in our baseline 
regression. 
 Overall, our findings in this section confirm our first hypothesis: relatively poor 
performing firms are matched with banks with relatively high market power. Essentially, we 
provide the first empirical test of an important element of the theoretical contribution by 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Boot and Thakor (2000) on the way the bank-firm 
relationships are formed, especially given the role of bank market power. In turn, these 
results show that the presence of banks with market power can be important in providing 
credit to relatively poor-performing firms, even in relatively competitive markets like the 
syndicated loan market.  
 
4.3. The effect of bank market power on firm performance after the loan origination 
Turning to the examination of H2, we estimate equation (2) with ROA in the year t+1 as the 
dependent variable and report the results in Table 4. We estimate all models with the full set 
of control variables and with bank and firm fixed effects, and we verify that the findings are 
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very similar if we exclude the firm and/ or the bank-level controls. To account for the 
possibility of a mean-reversion problem, we also include firm ROAt as an as an explanatory 
variable of ROAt+1. In most specifications, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 
positive and statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Further, we examine whether the effect of the Lerner index is non-linear by adding its 
squared term. This is equivalent to our suggestion in Section 2 that bank market power is 
beneficial for future firm performance, but too much bank market power will eventually lead 
to lower performance. Even though the squared term is by itself statistically insignificant in 
most of the models, the F-test for the joint significance of the Lerner index and its squared 
term (the p-value is reported in the bottom part of the table), shows that the relation is indeed 
an inverted U-shaped (bell-shaped). We can in fact calculate the point at which the effect of 
market power turns negative (turning point) by using the first derivative of the estimated 
equation with respect to the Lerner index. For instance, in column I this yields a value equal 
to 0.692, which is within the range of the Lerner index, but corresponds to only 218 loan 
facilities (0.9 percent of the sample) for which bank market power lowers future firm returns. 
This small economic effect of the squared term is intuitive given the relative competitiveness 
of the syndicated loan market.11 Even though the impact of the squared term is economically 
small, we keep it in the subsequent specifications for reasons of completeness and we use 
specification I of Table 4 as our baseline. 
 In models II and III of Table 4 we conduct an equivalent analysis with that of models 
II and III of Table 3, by using data at the loan-deal level and lead-arranger only, respectively. 
The results remain qualitatively similar to the ones in our benchmark specification. The 
turning point (where the impact of the Lerner index on ROAt+1 becomes negative) in column 
                                                            
11 We would expect that this effect would be quite larger in local loan markets with only few available lenders. 
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III is quite lower and there are 290 loan facilities (7.8% of the lead-arranger sample) for 
which a higher bank market power actually lowers future firm returns. 
 The column IV in Table 4 is a quite interesting test for our identification purposes. In 
this equation, we draw data only for the loan facilities in which the syndicate members (banks 
and firms) are repeated. This allows for a powerful test of the effect of the Lerner index on 
ROA because, given the firm and bank fixed effects, only the time variation in the Lerner 
index (and in the weights used to construct the Lerner index) will play a role in determining 
future ROA. The results are equivalent to those of the baseline specification I, showing that 
our findings are robust to endogeneity arising from differences in the structure of the 
syndicate. 
 In the rest of the specifications of Table 4, we provide a series of robustness tests in a 
similar fashion with Table 3. In column V we exclude the loans granted for LBOs and 
M&As, in column VI we exclude term loans, and in column VII we exclude the top three US. 
The statistical significance of market power is very similar across these three re-
specifications. The finding that excluding the term loans does not have an impact on our 
findings shows that the loan type does not play a role in the nexus between market power and 
future firm performance. The same is prevalent in the rest of the specifications, where the 
effect of Revolver is a statistically insignificant determinant of firm performance. As 
expected, excluding the top three banks somewhat lowers the economic significance of 
market power.12 
In column VIII of Table 4 we estimate equation (2) using only Commercial Paper 
Back Up and General Corporate Purpose loans13 with results being very similar to the ones in 
our baseline specification. The idea is that the screening process between borrowers and 
                                                            
12 Related to this finding, a notable result in all the regressions of Table 4 that use ROAt+1 as dependent variable 
is that Revolver is statistically insignificant. 
13 These contracts allow firms to borrow up to a predetermined amount of funds at a fixed spread over a safe 
market benchmark interest rate such as London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). With Commercial Paper Back 
Up and General Corporate Purpose contract, banks can provide firms with insurance against liquidity shocks. 
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lenders is less relevant for these loans (Ross, 2010) because they are given to borrowers that 
have already demonstrated their creditworthiness to the syndicated market. Thus, the fact that 
results do not change from our baseline model, allows us to attribute most of the effect of 
market power to the superior monitoring capacity of banks with market power.  
As a final, yet quite important sensitivity analysis to deal with the identification 
problem, by using an instrumental variable (IV) and a two-stage least squares estimator. 
Specifically, we use as an IV a dummy variable that takes the value one when the bank 
receives a formal regulatory enforcement action (for violation of laws, rules, and regulations) 
and zero otherwise. We use only those formal enforcement actions that are related to 
violations of rules of the internal control and audit systems of banks, as well the management 
of information (Delis, Staikouras, and Tsoumas, 2015). We expect that this class of 
enforcement actions is positively correlated with bank market power. The intuition is that 
banks with high market power will be less transparent with respect to their internal control 
and audit systems, precisely because they would be incentivized to hide their market power 
from the regulatory authorities. We do not expect that the regulatory actions of this kind will 
have a direct effect on firm performance, conditional on the rest of the bank-level control 
variables and the bank fixed effects. 
We report the estimation results in column IX of Table 4. The enforcement actions 
dummy is indeed a positive and statistically determinant of the Lerner index in the first stage 
(coefficient estimate equals 0.003, t-statistic equals 4.72). The coefficient estimates on the 
Lerner index are qualitative similar compared to the baseline specification. Also, the 
statistical significance and inference on the bell-shaped relation are very similar. The turning 
point is 0.326 and corresponds to 334 loan facilities (1.1 percent of the sample) for which 
bank market power is harmful for future firm performance. 
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Our data set and framework provides the opportunity to also test the theory of the 
relation between loan rates and competition in banking (Keeley, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 
1995). As a proxy for loan pricing we use AISD and in line with the most recent literature on 
this issue (e.g., Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010) we consider a non-linear effect of market 
power by adding the squared term of the Lerner index. Our results (column X of Table 4) 
indeed indicate a non-linear effect: an increase in bank market power increases AISD up to a 
level of the Lerner index equal to 0.414 and decreases AISD from that point onward (for 
approximately 2.5% of our sample). 
Besides the findings reported in Table 4, we conduct a series of other robustness tests 
and report them in Table B2 in the online Appendix. First, we use three alternative measures 
of firm performance (panel A), namely Tobin’s q, ROI, and Leverage. In line with our 
expectations and the results on ROA, we find that the Lerner index has a positive impact on 
Tobin’s q and ROI and a negative impact on Leverage. Further, in panel B we experiment 
with different methods to estimate the Lerner index (columns V-VII) and alternatives 
methods to weight the Lerner index (columns VIII-IX of online Appendix B2). Again the 
results are equivalent to those of Table 4. 
 In sum, our findings in this section suggest that H2 is confirmed: Bank market power 
has a positive effect on the performance of the borrowing firms after the origination of the 
loan for most of the loan facilities in our sample. From this viewpoint our findings confirm 
the theoretical considerations pointing to the positive real effects of bank market power (Boot 
and Thakor, 2000; Caminal and Matutes, 1997, 2002). However, we also find limited 
evidence that for very high levels of market power and for few loan facilities the results 
reverse. The fact that we analyze the syndicated loan market, which by its very nature is 
rather competitive, leads us to interpret this finding as evidence in favor of the theory by 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) on the risk-shifting effect. 
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[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
4.4 The effect of the monitoring effort on firm performance after the loan origination 
In the specifications of Table 5 we dig deeper into the monitoring-effort explanation of our 
results, based on the theoretical considerations discussed in section 2. Specifically, we 
introduce a number of interaction terms between the Lerner index and variables that 
characterize the monitoring incentives of banks. First, we assume that banks with market 
power will have a superior ability to use soft information during the monitoring process, 
whereas banks with less market power have to rely more on hard devices, such as written 
agreements for collateral, covenants, and performance pricing provisions. 
 To distinguish between soft and hard information we regress the loan amount 
(weighted by the shares of the banks in the syndicate) on the variables Downgrading, Default, 
Financial covenants, Collateral, Maturity, Performance pricing, and a set of bank dummies. 
These explanatory variables encompass the hard information used by banks in the monitoring 
process of the loan, while the residuals (named soft monitoring) encompass the soft 
information. Subsequently, we expect that the interplay between the interaction term of these 
residuals and the Lerner index will be positively associated with future firm performance, if 
indeed banks with higher market power are better equipped to use soft monitoring to guide 
firms after the loan origination. Indeed, we find some evidence (reported in column I of Table 
5) that as soft monitoring improves, the positive effect of the Lerner index on future firm 
ROA strengthens. 
 In the specifications of columns II to VI we include interaction terms between the 
Lerner index and variables directly used in the literature to proxy the incentives to monitor 
the loan (e.g., Sufi, 2007). In column II we interact the Lerner index with the number of 
lenders. The underlying assumption in this specification is that the higher the number of 
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lenders in the syndicated loan, the more intense the monitoring process of the loan. The 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that 
as the number of lenders increases (more intense loan monitoring) the positive effect of the 
Lerner index reinforces. 
 In column III we interact the Lerner index with the ratio of the deal amount (weighted 
by the shares of the banks in the syndicate) to the firm’s total assets (Dass and Massa, 2011). 
We assume that this variable (named loan significance) is also positively correlated with the 
incentives to monitor the loan because of the large amount of this loan relative to the size of 
the firm. Similarly to the previous two specifications, we find that as the loan significance 
increases, the effect of the Lerner index on firm ROA strengthens. 
 In column V we interact the Lerner index with the loan amount held by the syndicate 
members. Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011) suggest that “banks grant loans and monitor 
them, which helps improve firms’ performance”. Monitoring is costly and one way of 
providing banks with incentives is through the amount held by each syndicate member. 
Higher total exposure means that banks will internalize the cost of firms’ default. Thus, we 
assume that the total exposure is positively correlated with the monitoring effort and will 
determine the probability of success of the investment project (Sufi, 2007). The main effect 
of the Lerner index comes out positive and statistically significant as before. The interaction 
term is also positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, indicating that the 
higher is bank exposure, the higher the positive impact of the Lerner index on firm’s future 
performance. In column V we repeat the same analysis at the lead-arranger level instead of 
loan-facility level, the results being similar to those of column IV. 
In the last column of Table 5 we introduce an interaction term between the Lerner 
index and performance pricing. Performance pricing is interpreted as the main variable 
characterizing the monitoring incentives of the banks on paper (hard monitoring). However, 
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in this case we do not find a statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term. Thus, 
it seems that the soft monitoring capacity of banks with market power plays a more important 
role compared to the monitoring process documented on paper (hard monitoring) in 
enhancing the future performance of firms. In general, the results from specifications II-VI 
provide evidence that the higher the monitoring incentives of banks and the higher the 
capacity of banks to monitor the loan based on soft information, the more potent the effect of 
market power on future firm ROA. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Motivated by seminal theoretical contributions, we empirically investigate the 
correspondence between bank market power and firm performance, both before and after 
loan origination. In particular we examine 25,236 syndicated loan facilities granted between 
2000 and 2010 by 296 banks to 9,029 US non-financial firms. We find that the firms that are 
relatively poorly-performing match with banks with high market power. And even more 
importantly, we find a direct and positive effect of bank market power on firm profitability. 
Both findings are economically relevant and robust to the use of alternative profitability 
measures, and alterations in samples and model specifications. 
 Our estimates thus suggest that moderate levels of bank market power not only 
facilitate access to credit by poorly-performing firms but also boost the performance of those 
firms that obtain it. In contrast to other markets, policymaking may therefore have to not 
unilaterally focus on maximizing competition between banks. An interesting extension of our 
analysis is to examine the relation between bank market power and firm performance based 
on who initiates the relationship, the bank or the firm. We expect that such an analysis would 
shed more light on whether the identified relation between bank market power and firm 
performance is mainly driven by the initiative of relatively worse-performing firms to obtain 
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credit or by the incentives of banks with market power. Given data availability issues and the 
ground we already cover in this paper, we leave this analysis for future research. 
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 Table 1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
 
Dependent variables 
 
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets. Compustat  
Tobin's q The natural logarithm of the market-to-book value. Id. 
ROI The ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets. Id. 
Leverage The ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Id. 
Lerner index ܮܫ௕௧ ൌ ௉್೟ିெ஼್೟௉್೟ 	 ௕ܹ௧ , where P and MC are the price of bank output at time t 
and the marginal cost of the production of this output weighted by the shares 
of each bank W in the syndicated loan (equal shares are imposed where this 
information is not available). Marginal cost is estimated using a log-linear 
production function and total output is measured by total earning assets. 
Own estimations 
based on data 
from the Call 
Reports 
Lerner weighted by 
predicted shares 
We estimate the shares W from a model in which the loan amount of 
individual lenders is the dependent variable and a number of characteristics of 
the syndicate are the explanatory variables. We then use the estimated 
coefficients to predict the loan portion for those lenders for whom we do not 
know the actual amounts. 
Id. 
Lerner weighted by bank 
market shares 
We calculate the shares W as the market share that each bank has in the US 
market per quarter. 
Id. 
Lerner from linear cost 
function 
Variant of the Lerner index where the marginal cost is estimated using a 
linear production function.  
Id. 
Lerner from total assets Variant of the Lerner index where the marginal cost is estimated using total 
assets as the bank output.  
Id. 
Lerner from translog Variant of the Lerner index where the marginal cost is estimated with 
parametric techniques (OLS) and a translog cost function.  
Id. 
AISD The all-in-spread-drawn (AISD), describes the amount the borrower pays in 
basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down. 
Dealscan 
 
Loan-level explanatory variables 
 
Loan scale The deal amount over firm’s total assets Own estimations 
based on data 
from DealScan 
Downgrading A dummy variable equal to one if the loan is downgraded and zero otherwise. DealScan 
Financial covenants The number of financial covenants, taking values from zero to eight. Id. 
Collateral A dummy variable equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral and zero 
otherwise. 
Id. 
Maturity The natural logarithm of loan maturity in months. Id. 
Deal amount The natural logarithm of the deal’s loan amount. Id. 
Performance pricing A dummy variable equal to one if the loan has performance pricing provisions 
and zero otherwise. 
Id. 
Revolver A dummy variable equal to one if the loan is a revolver loan and zero 
otherwise. 
Id. 
Default A dummy variable equal to one when a borrower defaults and zero otherwise. NGRB  
 
Bank-level explanatory variables 
 
Non-performing loans The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans weighted by the shares of 
each bank in the syndicated loan. 
Call Reports 
Tier 1 capital The ratio of Tier 1 capital to total loans weighted by the shares of each bank 
in the syndicated loan. 
Id. 
Interest expenses The ratio of interest expenses to total assets weighted by the shares of each 
bank in the syndicated loan. 
Id. 
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Bank size The natural logarithm of total assets weighted by the shares of each bank in 
the syndicated loan. 
Id. 
Deposits The ratio of total deposits to total assets weighted by the shares of each bank 
in the syndicated loan. 
Id. 
 
Firm-level explanatory variables 
 
Number of loans The total number of syndicated loans that a firm has received during a year. DealScan 
Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets. Compustat  
Client A dummy variable equal to one if the firm has had a previous lending 
relationship with the lead arranger in the past five years. 
DealScan 
Firm efficiency The ratio of firm sales to total assets. Compustat  
Firm age Total years since founding. Compustat 
Firm sales Natural logarithm of sales over turnover (net).  
 
Monitoring variables 
 
Soft information We regress the loan amount (weighted by the shares of the bank in the 
syndicate) on the loan-level variables and a set of bank dummies. These 
explanatory variables encompass the hard information used by banks in the 
monitoring process of the loan. We then use the residuals to encompass the 
soft information. 
Own estimations 
based on data 
from DealScan 
Number of lenders The number of lenders that participate in a syndicated loan. DealScan 
Loan significance The loan amount (weighted by the shares of the bank in the syndicate) over 
the firm’s total assets. 
Own estimations 
based on data 
from DealScan 
Total exposure The loan amount (in millions) weighted by the shares of the bank in the 
syndicate. 
Own estimations 
based on data 
from DealScan 
Instrumental Variable 
Sanction A dummy variable equal to one when the banks receives a regulatory 
enforcement action (for violation of laws, rules, and regulations) and zero 
otherwise. 
Hand collected 
 Table 2. Summary statistics 
The table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are defined in Table 1. 
Variable Level Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
ROA Firm 27,646 0.015 0.456 -49.874 1.279 
Tobin's q Firm 24,552 0.500 0.390 -0.883 3.012 
ROI Firm 28,875 0.028 0.179 -4.195 11.566 
Leverage Firm 28,865 0.300 0.218 0.000 6.879 
Lerner index Bank 28,786 0.037 0.051 -0.172 0.881 
Lerner weighted by predicted shares Bank 28,811 0.028 0.040 -0.050 0.688 
Lerner weighted by bank market shares Bank 28,811 0.130 0.124 -0.173 0.915 
Lerner from linear cost function Bank 28,786 0.037 0.051 -0.166 0.879 
Lerner from total assets Bank 28,789 0.042 0.057 -0.126 0.889 
Lerner from translog Bank 28,691 0.025 0.042 -0.097 0.887 
AISD Loan 28,875 141.206 109.555 8.500 1,300.0 
Loan scale Loan 28,705 0.329 1.582 0.000 189.433 
Downgrading Loan 28,875 0.274 0.446 0.000 1.000 
Default  Loan 28,875 0.024 0.154 0.000 1.000 
Financial covenants Loan 28,875 1.924 1.498 0.000 7.000 
Collateral Loan 28,875 0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 
Maturity  Loan 28,875 3.574 0.704 0.000 5.257 
Deal amount Loan 28,875 6.113 1.239 -0.734 10.653 
Performance pricing Loan 28,875 0.660 0.474 0.000 1.000 
Non-performing loans Bank 28,001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.072 
Tier 1 capital Bank 28,001 0.019 0.044 0.000 2.432 
Interest expenses Bank 28,850 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.046 
Bank size Bank 28,001 2.147 2.760 0.000 20.928 
Deposits Bank 28,001 0.078 0.105 0.000 0.924 
Number of loans Firm 28,875 1.324 0.613 1.000 5.000 
Firm size Firm 25,101 7.935 1.750 -0.254 14.458 
Client Firm 28,875 0.572 0.495 0.000 1.000 
Firm efficiency Firm 25,067 0.981 0.828 -0.095 11.623 
Firm age Firm 28,875 23.802 17.575 1.000 60.000 
Firm sales Firm 25,042 7.562 1.633 -4.200 12.564 
Revolver Loan 28,875 0.809 0.393 0.000 1.000 
Soft information Loan 28,850 1.698 149.987 0.000 6784.103 
Number of lenders Loan 28,875 15.730 10.613 1.000 177.000 
Loan significance Loan 28,680 0.045 0.410 0.000 47.358 
Total exposure Loan 28,850 59.818 154.456 0.000 7,050.916 
Sanction Bank 28,875 0.006 0.077 0.000 1.000 
Variations for the main variables of interest across loans 
ROA Between: 0.140 
 Within: 0.454 
Lerner index Between: 0.106 
 Within: 0.068 
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Table 3. Bank market power and firm performance before the loan origination 
This Table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for equation 1. The dependent variable is the Lerner 
index. The variables are defined in Table 1. Each observation in the regressions corresponds to a different loan 
facility. Column I shows the results for our baseline regression. In columns II and III we conduct the analysis at the 
loan-deal level and only for the lead arrangers, respectively. In column IV we exclude loans granted for Leveraged 
Buyouts (LBOs) or Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). In column V, we restrict our sample only to revolver loans. 
In column VI, we exclude loans from the top three US banks. All regressions include bank and firm fixed effects and 
the standard errors are robust with different levels of clustering as shown in the last row of the Table. The *, **, *** 
marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  I II III IV V VI 
 Baseline Loan-deal 
level  
Lead 
arranger 
only 
Exclude loans 
for LBOs and 
M&As 
Revolver 
loans only 
Exclude loans 
from top three 
banks 
Firm ROAt-1 -0.009** -0.013** -0.038* -0.009** -0.010** -0.014** 
 (-2.167) (-2.324) (-1.853) (-2.244) (-2.433) (-2.298) 
Loan scale -0.000 0.001 0.005** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.259) (0.429) (2.252) (0.402) (-0.027) (0.431) 
Downgrading 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.001* 0.000 -0.001 
 (1.109) (-0.376) (0.772) (1.758) (0.704) (-0.928) 
Default 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.000 0.007** 
 (1.030) (1.510) (0.265) (0.945) (-0.445) (2.295) 
Financial covenant -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.991) (-1.558) (-0.791) (-1.277) (0.040) (-1.379) 
Collateral -0.001* -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001** 0.001 
 (-1.955) (-0.450) (0.419) (-0.315) (-2.250) (0.676) 
Maturity -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.851) (-0.511) (0.241) (-1.010) (-0.297) (0.556) 
Deal amount -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
 (-3.981) (-7.066) (-4.176) (-3.989) (-4.496) (-5.228) 
Performance pricing -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.853) (-0.530) (0.002) (-1.362) (-1.171) (-1.169) 
Non-performing loans 0.276 0.412 1.966* 0.445 0.358 0.033 
 (0.323) (0.798) (1.925) (0.550) (0.472) (0.045) 
Tier 1 capital 0.003 0.007 0.150 -0.002 -0.005 0.029 
 (0.131) (0.456) (1.425) (-0.103) (-0.278) (0.630) 
Bank size 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 
 (5.863) (16.198) (5.287) (5.926) (5.665) (15.798) 
Deposits -0.020 -0.039 -0.111 -0.009 -0.020 -0.077** 
 (-0.282) (-1.349) (-1.187) (-0.126) (-0.274) (-2.359) 
Number of loans 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (1.227) (-0.194) (-0.582) (0.882) (-0.084) (1.208) 
Firm size -0.003** -0.002 -0.001 -0.004** -0.001 -0.001 
 (-2.153) (-0.699) (-0.096) (-2.230) (-1.354) (-0.491) 
Client -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.003* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-4.408) (-5.123) (-1.959) (-4.464) (-3.676) (-2.657) 
Firm efficiency -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-1.442) (-1.397) (-0.307) (-1.478) (-0.821) (-0.332) 
Firm age -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.828) (-1.502) (-2.033) (-0.680) (-1.184) (-0.867) 
Firm sales -0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.257) (-1.399) (0.214) (0.235) (-1.176) (-1.069) 
Revolver 0.001** 0.002*** 0.000 0.001**  0.001* 
 (2.073) (2.788) (0.144) (2.428)  (1.911) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,940 9,758 2,240 21,897 20,298 11,997 
Adjusted R-squared 0.947 0.909 0.963 0.931 0.949 0.931 
Cluster Bank Loan Loan Bank Bank Loan 
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Table 4. The impact of bank’s market power on firm performance after the loan origination 
This Table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable in columns I-IX is the ROAt+1 and in column X is the AISD. The variables are defined in 
Table 1. Each observation in the regressions corresponds to a different loan facility. Column I shows the results for our baseline regression. In columns II, III, and IV we conduct 
the analysis at the loan-deal level, only for the lead arrangers, and for repeated syndicate members, respectively. In column V we exclude loans granted for Leveraged Buyouts 
(LBOs) or Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). In column VI, we restrict our sample only to revolver loans. In column VII, we exclude loans from the top three US banks. In 
column VIII we restrict our sample to Commercial Paper Back Up (CP back up) and General Corporate Purpose (GCP) loans. Column IX is estimated with two-stage least 
squares, using the internal control enforcement actions as an IV-style instrument. All regressions include bank and firm fixed effects and the standard errors are robust with 
different levels of clustering as shown in the last row of the Table. Joint significance is the p-value of the F-test for the joint significance of the coefficients on Lerner index and 
Lerner index squared. Turning point is the point on the Lerner index at which its effect on ROA turns negative. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1% level, respectively 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
 Baseline Loan-deal 
level 
analysis 
Lead 
arranger 
only 
Repeated 
syndicate 
members 
Exclude 
loans for 
LBO and 
M&A’s 
Revolver 
loan only 
Exclude 
loans 
from top 
three 
banks 
Only loans 
for CP 
back up 
and GCP 
2SLS AISD 
ROAt 0.225*** 0.202*** 0.299*** 0.121** 0.232*** 0.215*** 0.184*** 0.220 0.315*** -93.066*** 
 (4.765) (4.962) (4.025) (2.366) (3.565) (4.483) (3.441) (1.376) (5.446) (-4.477) 
Lerner index 0.345*** 0.360*** 0.472** 0.363** 0.383*** 0.326*** 0.242*** 0.507** 0.436*** 300.594*** 
 (3.507) (3.712) (2.237) (2.352) (3.522) (3.686) (2.741) (2.255) (3.481) (3.641) 
Lerner index squared -0.249 -0.246 -0.745*** -0.480 -0.313 -0.138 -0.047 -0.960* -0.667*** -362.981* 
 (-1.234) (-1.338) (-2.650) (-1.311) (-1.339) (-0.857) (-0.285) (-1.858) (-3.555) (-1.735) 
Downgrading -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.016** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.034*** -0.018*** -0.024*** -12.230*** 
 (-4.991) (-5.491) (-2.498) (-3.397) (-5.009) (-4.764) (-5.652) (-3.035) (-5.828) (-3.202) 
Default -0.052*** -0.058** -0.078 -0.056 -0.055*** -0.065*** -0.071*** -0.014 -0.104*** 10.450 
 (-3.047) (-2.474) (-1.569) (-0.982) (-2.658) (-2.927) (-2.725) (-0.611) (-2.836) (0.756) 
Financial covenant -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 5.828*** 
 (-1.089) (-1.359) (-0.274) (-0.692) (-1.332) (-0.166) (-0.967) (-0.677) (-1.488) (4.228) 
Collateral -0.004 -0.000 -0.005 -0.007 -0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.019 -0.020*** 38.542*** 
 (-0.539) (-0.040) (-0.649) (-0.649) (-0.094) (-0.741) (0.568) (1.322) (-4.177) (7.296) 
Maturity 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005* 0.004** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.006* 0.007*** -4.890*** 
 (2.901) (3.347) (1.746) (2.301) (3.198) (2.837) (0.389) (1.795) (2.837) (-3.151) 
Deal amount -0.008** -0.009*** -0.009** -0.010** -0.006 -0.005 -0.010** -0.002 -0.002 -0.607 
 (-2.095) (-3.751) (-2.495) (-2.161) (-1.602) (-1.379) (-2.383) (-0.342) (-1.032) (-0.299) 
Performance pricing 0.007 0.007* 0.006 0.014** 0.006 0.003 0.008* 0.004 0.005 -18.792*** 
 (1.542) (1.940) (1.302) (2.410) (1.088) (0.450) (1.922) (0.436) (1.041) (-5.701) 
Non-performing loans -0.712 -0.958 -0.775 -0.223 -1.011* -0.766 -1.142 -0.500 -1.404 4.702*** 
 (-1.153) (-1.167) (-0.622) (-0.152) (-1.664) (-1.276) (-1.492) (-0.534) (-1.382) (3.480) 
Tier 1 capital 0.018 0.015 0.256* -0.001 0.024* 0.021 0.063** 0.007 0.044** -47.940** 
 (1.307) (0.955) (1.731) (-0.042) (1.745) (1.504) (2.547) (0.310) (2.122) (-2.406) 
Interest expenses -2.622*** -1.165** -1.971 -1.414 -3.148*** -2.517*** -0.995 -4.531*** -2.354*** -4.515*** 
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 (-3.136) (-2.101) (-1.283) (-1.602) (-3.440) (-3.002) (-1.074) (-3.379) (-2.733) (-6.640) 
Bank size -0.006** -0.006** -0.008 -0.006* -0.006** -0.005** -0.009*** 0.000 -0.002 4.523** 
 (-2.525) (-2.003) (-1.145) (-1.833) (-2.239) (-2.325) (-3.847) (0.082) (-0.595) (2.048) 
Deposits 0.088 0.039 0.106 0.149* 0.096 0.044 0.122*** -0.024 -0.076 -110.695*** 
 (1.609) (0.700) (0.758) (1.750) (1.555) (0.932) (2.591) (-0.350) (-1.559) (-2.781) 
Number of loans -0.007** -0.010*** -0.021*** -0.007* -0.009** -0.009** -0.011** -0.011** -0.005 10.534*** 
 (-2.168) (-3.615) (-2.973) (-1.881) (-2.344) (-2.315) (-2.038) (-1.997) (-1.539) (3.405) 
Firm size -0.024* -0.020* -0.024 -0.022 -0.020 -0.020 -0.030*** -0.028 -0.011*** 10.455 
 (-1.922) (-1.823) (-1.519) (-1.124) (-1.324) (-1.631) (-2.585) (-0.918) (-3.276) (1.426) 
Client 0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -4.386* 
 (0.447) (-0.297) (1.399) (1.327) (0.214) (1.056) (-0.556) (-0.806) (-0.148) (-1.954) 
Firm efficiency 0.008 0.011** 0.018 0.020* 0.015** 0.010* 0.006 0.015 -0.002 -0.128 
 (1.453) (2.075) (1.084) (1.879) (2.110) (1.801) (1.499) (1.171) (-0.755) (-0.026) 
Firm age 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 1.722*** 
 (0.315) (0.849) (0.395) (0.403) (0.342) (-0.440) (-1.547) (0.064) (0.087) (2.700) 
Firm sales 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.024* 0.001 0.012*** -34.083*** 
 (0.087) (0.009) (-0.070) (-0.151) (-0.320) (0.152) (1.728) (0.041) (3.668) (-3.718) 
Revolver 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002  -0.000 0.007* 0.003 -23.272*** 
 (0.892) (0.612) (0.368) (0.637) (0.737)  (-0.281) (1.763) (0.907) (-11.826) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
IV No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Observations 23,993 9,334 2,836 4,005 21,743 19,605 12,104 11,809 23,993 24,895 
Hansen (P-value)         0.113  
F(P-value)         0.000  
Adjusted R-squared 0.810 0.781 0.966 0.668 0.818 0.817 0.841 0.650  0.781 
Joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.078 0.001 0.000 
Turning point 0.692 0.731 0.316 0.378 0.611 1.181 3.025 0.264 0.326 0.414 
Cluster Firm Loan Loan Loan Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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Table 5. The impact of bank’s market power on firm corporate performance after the loan origination: Tracing 
the effect of the monitoring effort 
This Table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable is the ROA. All specifications 
include the bank, loan and firm-level controls included in Table 4, except from column II, which does not include the 
loan-level controls. The variables are defined in Table 1. Each observation in the regressions corresponds to a different 
loan facility. All regressions include bank and firm fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered by firm. Hansen is 
the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 I II III IV V VI   
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Firm ROAt 0.232*** 0.225*** 0.226*** 0.227*** 0.303*** 0.224*** 
 (4.869) (4.753) (4.767) (4.812) (4.207) (4.758) 
Lerner index 0.395*** 0.443*** 0.360*** 0.352*** 0.454** 0.350*** 
 (3.881) (3.736) (3.375) (3.426) (2.023) (3.316) 
Lerner index squared -0.382* -0.725 -0.286 -0.239 -0.633** -0.331* 
 (-1.700) (-0.654) (-1.152) (-1.055) (-2.104) (-1.723) 
Soft information  -0.000***      
 (-3.410)      
Lerner index * Soft information 0.001*      
(1.771)      
Lerner index squared * Soft information -0.002      
(-1.637)      
Number of lenders  0.000     
  (0.572)     
Lerner index * Number of lenders  0.014*     
 (1.658)     
Lerner index squared * Number of lenders  -0.050     
 (-0.578)     
Loan significance   -0.110**    
   (-2.391)    
Lerner index * Loan significance   0.840**    
  (2.246)    
Lerner index squared * Loan significance   -1.230*    
  (-1.761)    
Total exposure    -0.000*** -0.000***  
    (-2.805) (-3.049)  
Lerner index * Total exposure    0.001** 0.000**  
    (2.002) (2.467)  
Lerner index squared * Total exposure     -0.002* -0.001*  
    (-1.886) (-1.884)  
Performance pricing      0.007* 
      (1.767) 
Lerner index * Performance pricing      0.051 
     (0.394) 
Lerner index squared * Performance 
pricing 
     -0.304 
     (-0.900) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lead-lender level No No No No Yes No 
Observations 23,394 23,394 23,394 23,394 2,163 23,394 
Adjusted R-squared 0.801 0.803 0.804 0.803 0.970 0.803 
Bank control characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm control characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan control characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
  
Appendix A. Estimation of marginal cost 
We estimate marginal cost using both semi-parametric and parametric estimation methods. 
For the semi-parametric method, which is the one favored here, we use the following log-
linear cost function: 
 ݈݊ܥ௜௧ ൌ ܽଵ ൅ ܽଶሺݖ௜௧ሻ݈݊ܳ௜௧ ൅ ܽଷ݈݊ݓ௜௧௟ ൅ ܽସ݈݊ݓ௜௧௞ ൅ ܽହ݈݊ݓ௜௧ௗ ൅ ݁௜௧           (A.1) 
In (A.1) C is the total cost of the bank i at time t, measured by the deflated total interest 
expenses and total noninterest expenses; Q is the total output of each bank, measured by the 
deflated total earning assets (or simply total assets in robustness tests); wl is the price of labor, 
measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets; wk is the price of physical capital, 
measured by the ratio of overheads minus personnel expenses to fixed assets; and wd is the 
price of intermediation funds, measured by the ratio of total interest expenses to total 
customer deposits. In alternative specifications, we also include the price of financial capital, 
as measured by the ratio of equity capital to total assets, as well as measures of bank risk 
(ratio of non-performing loans or loan-loss provisions to total loans), the results being 
unaffected. We collect data for these variables from the Call Reports (annual end-year 
reports).   
 Equation (A.1) has parametric parts (those related to the input prices) and a non-
parametric part (that related to bank output). The variable z, which is the so-called smoothing 
parameter, is crucial for the identification of the model and must be a variable that is highly 
correlated with a2 and considerably varies by bank-year. Delis, Kokas, and Ongena (2015) 
propose using ݖ ൌ ݈݊ݓ௜௧௟ ൅ ݈݊ݓ௜௧௞ , which is intuitive given the high potential correlation of 
input prices with the output elasticity of costs. We use the same approach and we also verify 
that using each input price separately yields similar results. Further, we impose the linear 
homogeneity restriction in input prices by normalizing total cost and the input prices by the 
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price of deposits before taking logs. From (A.1) we can obtain the marginal cost at the bank-
year level as డ஼೔೟డொ ൌ ܽଶሺ
஼೔೟
ொ೔೟ሻ to calculate the Lerner index. 
 The actual estimation methodology of the semi-parametric model follows the 
paradigm of Fan and Zhang (1999) and Mamuneas, Savvides, and Stengos (2006). 
Specifically, and by dropping the t subscript for simplicity, we can write (A.1) in econometric 
form as follows: 
   1 2| .i i i i i i i iY Y W e X V Z e                    (A.2) 
In this equation, β2 is a function of one or more variables with dimension k added to the 
vector Z. The linear part in (A.2) is in line with the idea of the semiparametric model as 
opposed to a nonparametric model (e.g., Zhang, Lee, and Song, 2002). The coefficients of the 
linear part are estimated in the first step as averages of the polynomial fitting by using an 
initial bandwidth chosen by cross-validation (Hoover, Rice, Wu, and Yang, 1998). We then 
average these estimates β1i and β2i to receive β1 and β2 in (A.2).  
 In the second step we use the average estimates and (A.2) to redefine the dependent 
variable as follows: 
  * *2ˆi i i i i iY Y X V z e      ,               (A.3) 
where the asterisks denote the redefined dependent variable and error term. β2(z) is a vector 
of smooth but unknown functions of zi, estimated using a local least squares of the form 
1
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Equation (A.4) represents a local constant estimator, where K(z, λ) is a kernel function, λ is 
the smoothing parameter (chosen by generalized cross validation) for sample size n, and k is 
the dimension of zi.  
If we assume that z is a scalar and K is a uniform kernel, then (A.4) can be written as 
follows: 
1
2 *
2
| | | |
ˆ ( )
j j
j j j
z z z z
z V V Y
 


   
               .               (A.5) 
In (A.5), 2ˆ( )z is a least squares estimator obtained by regressing *jY on jV , using the 
observations of ( jV , 
*
jY ) for which the corresponding zj is close to z, that is, | |jz z   . 
Therefore, to estimate 2ˆ( )z , we only use observations within this “sliding window.” Note 
that no assumptions are made about this estimator globally, but locally—within the sliding 
window—we assume that 2ˆ( )z  can be well-approximated. Also, because ߚଶሺݖሻ is a smooth 
function of z, |ߚଶ൫ݖ௝൯ െ ߚଶሺݖሻ| is small when | |jz z  is small. The condition that nλ is large 
ensures that we have sufficient observations within the interval | |jz z    when 2( )jz  is 
close to 2( )z . Therefore, under the conditions 0   and kn    (for k≥1), the local 
least squares regression of *jY on jV  provides a consistent estimate of 2( )z  (for a proof, see 
Li, Huang, Li, and Fu, 2002). Therefore, the estimation method is usually referred to as a 
local regression. 
 The main merit of this approach is that it is quite more flexible than the usual 
parametric functional forms (e.g., the translog) and this can lead to substantial improvement 
in the precision of the estimates. However, we also use a translog specification and the same 
outputs and input prices and our end results of the paper (those relating to the two hypotheses 
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of our paper) remain very similar. We also repeat the analysis using a fully parametric model 
(i.e., a3 to a5 are also functions of z), with our end results again being similar. 
  
 
 
Table A1. Average estimates of market power 
This table reports average estimates of market power by year. Averages are obtained from the bank-year level 
estimates of market power using the Lerner index, as this is defined in equation (3). Higher values reflect higher 
market power (lower competition). 
   Distribution by bank size 
   10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Year Lerner 
index  
Lerner 
index 
weighted 
by shares 
Lerner 
index 
weighted 
by shares 
Lerner 
index 
weighted 
by shares 
Lerner 
index 
weighted 
by shares 
Lerner 
index 
weighted 
by shares 
Lerner 
index 
weighted 
by shares 
2000 0.240 0.037 0.005 0.009 0.014 0.019 0.024 
2001 0.267 0.039 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.022 0.028 
2002 0.357 0.050 0.007 0.013 0.021 0.032 0.038 
2003 0.364 0.054 0.008 0.013 0.021 0.031 0.040 
2004 0.376 0.056 0.007 0.012 0.021 0.031 0.042 
2005 0.332 0.052 0.007 0.012 0.018 0.028 0.038 
2006 0.277 0.047 0.006 0.009 0.016 0.026 0.036 
2007 0.251 0.044 0.005 0.008 0.014 0.024 0.033 
2008 0.262 0.049 0.006 0.010 0.016 0.024 0.035 
2009 0.348 0.065 0.006 0.011 0.020 0.030 0.043 
2010 0.354 0.064 0.007 0.011 0.018 0.031 0.042 
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Appendix B. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
Table B1. Bank market power and firm performance before the loan origination: Sensitivity analysis 
This Table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable is the Lerner index. The variables are 
defined in table 1. Each observation in the regressions corresponds to a different loan facility. All regressions include bank and 
firm fixed effects and the standard errors are robust with different levels of clustering as shown in the last row of the Table. The *, 
**, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
 Bank FE Purpose FE Cluster by year Cluster by loan Lerner 
weighted 
by 
predicted 
shares 
Lerner 
weighted 
by bank 
market 
shares 
Lerner 
from 
translog 
Firm ROAt-1 -0.003** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009*** -0.007** -0.035** -0.009* 
 (-2.317) (-2.275) (-3.119) (-2.756) (-2.324) (-2.495) (-1.795) 
Loan scale -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 
 (-0.051) (-0.289) (-0.510) (-0.315) (-0.119) (-1.161) (-0.245) 
Downgrading 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.001 
 (1.782) (1.097) (1.954) (1.163) (0.977) (2.010) (1.502) 
Default 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.296) (1.034) (1.571) (1.151) (1.065) (-0.447) (0.872) 
Financial covenant 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.002** -0.000 
 (1.033) (-0.916) (-1.040) (-1.542) (0.733) (2.444) (-1.249) 
Collateral -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.006*** -0.001*** 
 (-1.303) (-1.567) (-1.067) (-1.080) (-2.004) (-3.750) (-2.706) 
Maturity -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.002** -0.000 
 (-2.606) (-0.742) (-0.569) (-1.155) (-2.436) (-2.465) (-0.981) 
Deal amount -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 
 (-2.559) (-4.082) (-4.818) (-6.390) (-2.673) (-3.466) (-4.117) 
Performance pricing -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-1.832) (-0.744) (-0.985) (-0.843) (0.436) (-1.094) (-1.628) 
Non-performing loans -0.641 0.276 0.276 0.276 1.695 -0.260 0.121 
 (-0.363) (0.324) (0.380) (0.592) (1.352) (-0.242) (0.114) 
Tier 1 capital 0.038 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.021 0.017 0.015 
 (0.756) (0.129) (0.186) (0.215) (-0.869) (0.706) (0.517) 
Bank size 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.010** 
 (3.215) (5.906) (7.793) (14.874) (4.434) (5.875) (2.081) 
Deposits 0.105 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 0.005 0.007 0.027 
 (1.113) (-0.276) (-0.521) (-0.642) (0.060) (0.094) (0.243) 
Number of loans 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
 (0.837) (1.424) (0.779) (1.071) (0.968) (1.445) (0.859) 
Firm size 0.000 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.002* -0.008* -0.004*** 
 (0.126) (-2.245) (-2.636) (-2.744) (-1.840) (-1.847) (-2.659) 
Client -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.001*** 
 (-4.089) (-4.467) (-4.537) (-4.745) (-3.313) (-4.496) (-4.987) 
Firm efficiency -0.000 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
 (-0.412) (-1.361) (-1.990) (-1.616) (-1.321) (-0.826) (-1.567) 
Firm age 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.001*** -0.000 
 (1.482) (-1.114) (-0.424) (-1.070) (-2.315) (-2.637) (-1.588) 
Firm sales -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
 (-0.200) (-0.237) (-0.488) (-0.279) (0.229) (-0.440) (0.010) 
Revolver -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001** 0.000* 0.001 0.001** 
 (-0.503) (1.384) (1.586) (2.293) (1.870) (1.228) (2.454) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,940 24,940 24,940 24,326 24,326 24,272 23,963 
Adjusted R-squared 0.861 0.948 0.787 0.947 0.918 0.898 0.839 
Cluster Bank Bank Year Loan Bank Bank Bank 
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Table B2. The impact of bank’s market power on corporate performance after the loan origination: Sensitivity analysis 
This Table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable in Panel A is reported in the second line of the Table. The dependent variable for Panel B is the ROA 
The variables are defined in Table 1. Each observation in the regressions corresponds to a different loan facility. The Lerner index in column VI is the Lerner from a linear cost function, in 
column VI the Lerner from total assets, and in column VII the Lerner from translog (see Table 1 for more details). All regressions include bank and firm fixed effects and the standard errors 
are clustered by firm. Joint significance is the p-value of the F-test for the joint significance of the coefficients on Lerner index and Lerner index squared. Turning point is the point on the 
Lerner index at which its effect on ROA turns negative. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Panel A Panel B 
 I II III V VI VI VII VIII IX 
 Tobin's q ROI Leverage Linear 
analysis 
Lerner from 
linear cost 
function 
Lerner from 
total assets 
Lerner from 
translog 
Lerner 
weighted by 
predicted 
shares 
Lerner 
weighted by 
bank 
market 
shares 
Dependent variablet 0.250*** 0.194*** -0.145*** 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.227*** 0.226*** 
 (2.756) (4.466) (-3.216) (4.764) (4.766) (4.762) (4.764) (4.813) (4.775) 
Lerner index 1.281*** 0.236*** -0.486*** 0.239*** 0.317*** 0.272*** 0.241*** 0.359*** 0.172*** 
 (5.523) (3.103) (-3.479) (3.664) (3.240) (2.949) (2.837) (4.531) (3.739) 
Lerner index squared -1.488*** -0.084 0.610***  -0.221 -0.169 -0.215 -0.440*** -0.152** 
 (-3.206) (-0.481) (2.844)  (-1.108) (-0.991) (-0.881) (-2.646) (-2.063) 
Downgrading -0.039*** -0.019*** 0.011** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (-3.920) (-5.000) (2.387) (-4.989) (-4.992) (-4.984) (-4.992) (-4.961) (-4.952) 
Default 0.054* -0.055*** 0.006 -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.054*** 
 (1.815) (-3.089) (0.237) (-3.040) (-3.039) (-3.032) (-3.026) (-3.242) (-3.226) 
Financial covenant 0.011*** -0.001 -0.006* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (3.008) (-0.611) (-1.804) (-1.092) (-1.094) (-1.110) (-1.114) (-1.134) (-1.127) 
Collateral -0.026** -0.007 0.025*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-2.228) (-1.270) (3.160) (-0.567) (-0.541) (-0.549) (-0.528) (-0.493) (-0.568) 
Maturity 0.028*** 0.005** -0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (6.640) (2.552) (-4.099) (2.874) (2.892) (2.895) (2.903) (2.967) (2.988) 
Deal amount -0.020*** -0.006* 0.024*** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.009** -0.007** 
 (-3.858) (-1.790) (5.721) (-2.154) (-2.116) (-2.138) (-2.091) (-2.448) (-2.119) 
Performance pricing -0.017** 0.005 -0.000 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 
 (-2.210) (1.466) (-0.024) (1.520) (1.539) (1.544) (1.550) (1.477) (1.622) 
Non-performing loans -8.273*** -0.463 2.156* -0.650 -0.753 -0.587 -0.732 0.260 0.031 
 (-3.119) (-0.696) (1.898) (-1.037) (-1.225) (-0.942) (-1.182) (0.337) (0.135) 
Tier 1 capital 0.181*** 0.015 -0.025 0.015 0.018 0.012 0.017 0.004 -0.000 
 (3.694) (1.123) (-1.074) (1.124) (1.375) (0.915) (1.302) (0.265) (-0.076) 
Interest expenses -13.989*** -1.634** 1.438 -2.568*** -2.777*** -2.930*** -2.988*** -2.206*** -0.687*** 
 (-5.607) (-2.212) (1.445) (-3.106) (-3.330) (-3.403) (-3.609) (-2.937) (-2.835) 
Bank size -0.011* -0.005*** 0.004 -0.005** -0.006** -0.006** -0.003 -0.003* -0.002** 
 (-1.828) (-2.837) (1.342) (-2.360) (-2.399) (-2.289) (-1.390) (-1.649) (-2.402) 
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Deposits 0.105 0.053 -0.025 0.088 0.095* 0.092* 0.074 -0.008 0.020 
 (0.915) (1.424) (-0.424) (1.604) (1.712) (1.665) (1.378) (-0.183) (1.234) 
Number of loans -0.007 -0.006* 0.015*** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (-0.795) (-1.827) (3.517) (-2.163) (-2.165) (-2.167) (-2.148) (-2.131) (-2.174) 
Firm size -0.087*** -0.026*** -0.006 -0.024* -0.024* -0.024* -0.024* -0.025* -0.025** 
 (-4.535) (-2.846) (-0.590) (-1.927) (-1.924) (-1.935) (-1.911) (-1.953) (-1.984) 
Client 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.600) (-0.538) (0.133) (0.417) (0.436) (0.417) (0.424) (0.370) (0.488) 
Firm efficiency 0.009 0.006 -0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 (0.714) (1.437) (-1.175) (1.447) (1.449) (1.441) (1.482) (1.349) (1.425) 
Firm age 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.322) (-0.903) (0.049) (0.300) (0.317) (0.306) (0.328) (0.390) (0.418) 
Firm sales -0.002 0.009 -0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.116) (0.993) (-0.416) (0.072) (0.077) (0.080) (0.080) (0.058) (0.130) 
Revolver 0.007* 0.002 -0.008*** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.818) (1.028) (-3.571) (0.888) (0.895) (0.895) (0.903) (0.960) (1.006) 
Bank and Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,618 23,989 23,982 23,993 23,993 23,996 23,963 24,016 24,016 
Adjusted R-squared 0.873 0.801 0.873 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.808 0.809 0.810 
Joint significance 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Turning point 0.430 1.404 0.398  0.717 0.804 0.560 0.410 0.565 
 
